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* Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, Sitting by Designation. 
 
 
  
       Thomas P. Preston (Argued) 
       Reed Smith 
       1201 Market Street 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we return to familiar terrain to determine 
whether the expulsion of three state-licensed horse-trainers 
and horse owners by a privately owned harness racing 
association from its racetrack without a hearing constitutes 
state action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 1 The District 
Court concluded that no state action was present and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dover Downs, the 
racetrack operator. Because the plaintif fs presented 
conclusive evidence that the track enjoyed a symbiotic 
relationship with the State of Delaware, we reverse. 
 
I. 
 
Appellee, Dover Downs, Inc. (Dover Downs), is a 
subsidiary of Dover Downs Entertainment Inc., a publicly 
held corporation operated for profit. Dover Downs is 
licensed by the Delaware Harness Racing Commission 
(HRC) to conduct harness races at its track in Dover, 
Delaware. It conducts harness racing meets six months out 
of every year, during which time no other track in Delaware 
holds harness racing meets.2 Dover Downs also operates 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any . . . 
regulation . . . of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any 
citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or any 
other 
proper proceeding for redress." 
 
2. Harrington Raceway, the only other licensed harness racing facility in 
Delaware, conducts races during the six months each year that Dover 
Downs does not. 
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video lottery gambling and other entertainment activities at 
its facility. 
 
Harness racing is a heavily regulated business in 
Delaware, as it is in most states. The State of Delaware 
plays an active role in the management of the harness 
racing operation at Dover Downs. The State r equires that 
14 harness racing officials assigned to Dover Downs, with 
titles ranging from "equipment checker" to "state 
veterinarian," be licensed by the HRC. Although Dover 
Downs pays and supervises these officials, HRC rules set 
forth their duties and job descriptions in detail. Moreover, 
HRC rules require Dover Downs to "enfor ce the [Harness 
Racing] Act and the rules and orders of the Commission." 
 
In 1993, Delaware passed the "Horsemen's Revitalization 
Act," whose stated purpose was to rejuvenate the declining 
Delaware horse-racing industry. See 29 Del. C. S 4801(b)(1). 
To achieve this goal, the legislature authorized harness 
racetracks such as Dover Downs to operate "video lottery 
machines", commonly known as slot machines, on the 
premises. The State, rather than Dover Downs, owns or 
leases the slot machines, which are dir ectly connected to 
the Delaware State Lottery Office for monitoring and 
control. See 29 Del. C. S 4819. Dover Downs, as a "video 
lottery agent," is responsible for securing and operating the 
machines, and is free to determine the number of machines 
it chooses to house, up to the statutory maximum of 1000 
machines. See 29 Del. C. S 4820. Nonetheless, a Delaware 
statute plainly states that the video lottery is operated "by 
the State Lottery Office." 29 Del. C. S 4815(b)(2). 
 
The State also exercises complete contr ol over the 
distribution of revenue from the slot machines. A Delaware 
statute requires Dover Downs to send all r evenue from the 
lottery machines, net of payouts to patrons, to an account 
controlled by the State Lottery Office. See Del. C. S 4815(b). 
The funds received by this account are then distributed in 
accordance with Delaware statute, which is painstakingly 
specific. First, the State pays administrative costs 
associated with the operation of the lottery, including the 
salaries of state lottery personnel. Next, Gamblers 
Anonymous and similar programs receive a share. The 
State then receives a large percentage share of the money 
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that remains. The statute then directs that a percentage of 
the remaining funds be given to racetracks such as Dover 
Downs "to be applied under the direction of the Delaware 
Harness Racing Commission to purses for races conducted 
at such agent's racetrack." 29 Del. C. S 4815. Finally, Dover 
Downs, as a video lottery agent, receives a statutorily 
designated "commission." See 29 Del. C. S 4815(b)(4) c & d. 
 
Charles, Wendy, and Christine Crissman ar e, and at all 
relevant times have been, duly licensed by the state of 
Delaware to own and train race horses. In October 1997, 
Charles Lockhart, the newly-appointed general manager of 
Dover Downs, informed the Crissmans that they were no 
longer welcome at Dover Downs and that Dover Downs 
would no longer permit them to race horses there. Lockhart 
offered the Crissmans no explanation for their exclusion 
and no opportunity to be heard. Lockhart's deposition in 
this proceeding discloses that he expelled the Crissmans 
because he had heard unconfirmed rumors that the HRC 
was investigating Charles Crissman for certain alleged 
improprieties. Lockhart decided to exclude W endy and 
Christine Crissman only because they had applied jointly 
with Charles Crissman to race at Dover Downs. The 
Crissmans, however, were all licensed in good standing and 
there is no indication of record that they had violated 
Delaware's harness racing rules.3 
 
The Crissmans filed suit against Dover Downs under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware. The complaint alleged that Dover 
Downs had denied the plaintiffs due pr ocess of law in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The plaintiffs sought damages, as well as 
preliminary and permanent injunctive r elief restraining the 
defendants from denying them access to the racetrack. 
When they filed their complaint, the Crissmans moved for 
a temporary restraining order. The District Court denied the 
motion, holding that the Crissmans were unlikely to prevail 
on the merits. Dover Downs then moved for summary 
judgment. The District Court granted the motion, holding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. On or about November 1, 2000, Christine Crissman stipulated to a 
dismissal of her appeal with prejudice. 
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that the Crissmans had failed to adduce sufficient evidence 
that Dover Downs acted under color of state law as 
required by 42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
II. 
 
The primary question presented by this lawsuit is 
whether Dover Downs' exclusion of the Crissmans 
constituted state action, a necessary element of a 
successful section 1983 suit. The starting point for our 
state action analysis is the seminal case of Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S.Ct. 856 
(1961). In that case, the plaintiff sued a privately owned 
restaurant for racial discrimination. The r estaurant leased 
the land on which it stood from a state agency, which ran 
the adjacent public parking garage. After examining the 
close relationship between the restaurant and the state 
agency, the Supreme Court concluded that state action was 
present. The Burton Court enunciated a"symbiotic 
relationship" test. It provides that when the state has not 
clearly directed the private act of discrimination, but it "has 
so far insinuated itself into a position of inter dependence" 
with the private actor, the state "must be recognized as a 
joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at 725; 
Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc. , 607 F.2d 589, 
594 (3d Cir. 1979). The Court emphasized that"only by 
sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the 
nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be 
attributed its true significance." Id. at 722. 
 
The Court later refined the symbiotic r elationship test in 
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965 
(1972). There, the Court held state action to be absent in a 
case challenging racial discrimination by a private club that 
was heavily regulated by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control 
Board. The essence of the Court's holding was that 
extensive and detailed regulation of a private entity is 
generally insufficient to convert that entity into a state 
actor. See id. at 176-177. The Court distinguished the 
situation in Moose Lodge from that in Burton on the ground 
that, unlike the private restaurant in Burton, the Moose 
Lodge was a private club operating on private land and that 
the regulation of the Moose Lodge, detailed as it was in 
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some particulars, could not be said "to in any way foster or 
encourage racial discrimination." Id. at 176-177. In 
addition, the court noted that, in spite of the r egulation to 
which the State subjected the Moose Lodge, the State could 
not be said to be "a partner or even a joint venturer in the 
club's enterprise." Id. at 177. 
 
III. 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the r ecord 
could not lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving 
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
248-49 (1986). The court making this determination must 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non- 
movant. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). 
 
Dover Downs attempts to portray its relationship to the 
State as one consisting solely of "regulations and revenue." 
Such a relationship is generally insufficient to constitute a 
symbiotic relationship under Burton. See Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Hadges 
v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 918 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 
1990). However, we believe that the r ecord in this case 
shows that the affairs of the State and the racetrack were 
much more than a regulatory relationship between the 
State and a private gambling enterprise. For instance, the 
slot machines used by Dover Downs, like the leased 
restaurant building in Burton, ar e the property of, or leased 
by, the State. Cf. Fulton v. Hecht, 545 F.2d 540, 542-43 
(5th Cir. 1977)(finding symbiotic r elationship absent and 
emphasizing that private party was not a lessee of state 
property). The State maintains control over these slot 
machines by directly connecting them to the central 
computer system at the State Lottery Office. In addition, 
and perhaps most important to the symbiotic r elationship 
analysis, Dover Downs is the State's agent in the video 
lottery enterprise. Because of this agency r elationship, the 
State stands to gain or lose substantial revenue as a result 
of business decisions made by Dover Downs.4 The situation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As it turns out, the stakes are quite high. In 1998, slot machines from 
Delaware's three video lottery agents br ought $206 million into 
Delaware's General Fund. 
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here is even more striking than the symbiotic relationship 
found in Burton, where the State primarily acted as 
landlord to the privately-owned restaurant and had no 
direct stake in its financial success beyond its ability to pay 
rent. 
 
Dover Downs urges this court to view the video lottery 
operation in which, Dover Downs concedes, the State is 
heavily involved, as separate from its har ness-racing 
activities. It argues that, because the Crissmans were 
banned from participating in harness races, this court 
should only analyze the State's connection to Dover Downs' 
harness racing operation. This argument misses the point 
of the symbiotic relationship test,5  which predicates state 
action not merely on its participation in the challenged 
conduct, but on the overall involvement of the State in the 
affairs of the private entity. See Braden v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 958 (3d Cir. 1977)(holding that 
symbiotic relationship test does not require that the state 
be involved in the challenged action). The purpose behind 
the Burton decision was to recognize a state as "a joint 
participant in the challenged activity" when it has 
"insinuated itself into a position of inter dependence with" 
the private actor. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. When such a 
relationship of interdependence exists, aS 1983 plaintiff 
need not show state participation in the challenged activity. 
See id. at 958. 
 
Moreover, Dover Downs' contention that we should ignore 
the State's involvement in the video lottery is not persuasive 
because the record reflects that video lottery is inextricably 
linked with Dover Downs' harness-racing operation. The 
State of Delaware created the video lottery for the express 
purpose of providing "assistance in the for m of increased 
economic activity and vitality for Delaware's harness and 
thoroughbred horse racing industries, which activity and 
vitality will . . . cause increased employment." See 29 Del.C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Dover Downs' argument is more in tune with the "close nexus" test, 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974), which held that, in the absence of a symbiotic 
relationship, state action may be found if the state was a participant in 
the challenged activity. 
 
                                7 
  
S 4801(b)(1). Under Delaware law, Dover Downs would not 
be permitted to operate a video lottery if it did not conduct 
harness racing meets. See 29 Del. C.S 4819(a). To 
effectuate the stated purpose of the statute, Delaware gives 
a portion of the lottery's revenue to Dover Downs to be 
applied to harness racing purses "under the direction of the 
Delaware Harness Racing Commission." 29 Del. C. 
S 4815(b)(3) b.2. Thus, the recipients of harness racing 
purses are direct beneficiaries of r evenues derived from the 
video lotteries jointly operated by the State and the race 
track. Furthermore, Dover Downs also specifically 
participates in the revenues generated by the video lottery. 
 
Finally, we note that the State of Delaware is involved in 
Dover Downs' harness racing activities. Ther e are many 
positions which Dover Downs is not permitted to fill 
without State approval. The HRC requir es no fewer than 14 
harness racing officials to be licensed 6 and it reserves the 
right to designate other positions that requir e licenses. 
Although Dover Downs pays and supervises these officials, 
HRC rules describe their duties and responsibilities in 
detail. Most importantly, HRC rules requir e Dover Downs 
not only to abide by, but also to "enfor ce the [Harness 
Racing] Act and the rules and orders of the Commission." 
(App. at 67)(emphasis added). In Jackson, the Supreme 
Court stated that the petitioner's case for state action 
would have been stronger if the private actor had 
"exercise[d] . . . some power delegated to it by the State 
which is traditionally associated with sover eignty." Jackson, 
419 U.S. at 352-53. The power to enforce laws is one such 
power, the delegation of which converts Dover Downs into 
an executive arm of the HRC. Of course, heavy state 
regulation alone of a private entity does not necessarily give 
rise to a Burton symbiotic relationship. However, the 
undisputed facts here show such a deliberate entwining 
and interdependence between the State and Dover Downs, 
not only in the operation of the State Lottery but also in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The following individuals must be licensed by the HRC: state steward, 
board of judges, racing secretary, paddock judge, horse identifier and 
equipment checker, clerk of the course, official starter, official 
charter, 
official timer, photo finish technician, patrol judge, program director, 
State veterinarian, and LASIX veterinarian. (App. at 59). 
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harness racing operations at the track. The State's 
concerns in the "economic activity and vitality" of the 
racetrack operation is a matter of statutory expr ession. The 
overall involvement of the State in the affairs of the race 
track is manifest. We reject, ther efore, Dover Downs' 
arguments that the State specifically must be involved in 
the challenged activity or that the lottery activities can be 
insulated from the race track operations. 
 
For all of the reasons discussed above, the Crissmans 
have established that a symbiotic relationship exists 
between Delaware and Dover Downs. The District Court's 
grant of summary judgment for Dover Downs on the state 
action issue will therefore be reversed. 
 
IV. 
 
Our inquiry does not end with the state action analysis 
because, even if state action is present, the Crissmans 
must also demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to 
whether their constitutional right to Due Pr ocess was 
violated. We must now consider whether the Crissmans 
made such a showing, a question which the District Court 
did not address. 
 
In Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing , supra, this Court 
held that a horse trainer who had been summarily evicted 
from the track where he previously raced had made out a 
case of deprivation of due process. This court recognized 
that "Fitzgerald had a liberty interest in his employment 
reputation protected by the Due Pr ocess Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment." Id. The court further noted his 
liberty interest in earning a livelihood, stating, 
 
       Mountain Laurel had officially recognized Fitzgerald's 
       status as a state licensed trainer and driver by allowing 
       him to perform these activities at the track. His 
       summary expulsion significantly altered a`status 
       previously recognized by state law' and denied him the 
       opportunity of earning a livelihood. W e, therefore, agree 
       that Fitzgerald has a cognizable liberty inter est. 
 
Id., quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976). 
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The facts of this case bear considerable similarity to 
those in Fitzgerald. Like Fitzgerald, the Crissmans are and 
have been at all relevant times, licensed by the state of 
Delaware to train and race horses. Prior to the challenged 
expulsion, Dover Downs had recognized that status by 
allowing them to race their horses there. Mor eover, the 
expulsion "significantly altered a status previously 
recognized by state law" by prohibiting them from using 
their Delaware racing licenses during the six months each 
year when Dover Downs conducts the only harness racing 
meets in the state. 
 
Dover Downs argues that it "has not taken any action to 
impede Appellants from pursuing their employment at any 
other track."7 However, it is not necessary under Fitzgerald 
for the Crissmans to prove that they can no longer race 
anywhere in order to make out a S 1983 case. Fitzgerald, 
like the Crissmans, was only evicted from one track. There 
is nothing in the opinion to indicate that he was banned 
from racing anywhere or even that he was banned from 
racing throughout Pennsylvania. Although the Crissmans 
are still free to race their horses at Harrington Raceway and 
at tracks in other states, their Delaware racing licenses are 
of no use to them for half of every year because of Dover 
Downs' summary expulsion. 
 
Dover Downs also disputes whether the Crissmans' 
reputations were damaged by their exclusion from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Dover Downs cites Greene v. McElr oy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) as support 
for the proposition that the denial of an employment opportunity does 
not amount to a liberty or property right unless the plaintiff is entirely 
deprived of his ability to earn a living in his chosen profession. 
However, 
Greene erects no such barrier to Due Process claims based on the denial 
of employment opportunities. Rather, it mer ely noted that in that case, 
the plaintiff 's career had been "seriously affected, if not destroyed" by 
the government's action. Id. at 492. It then stated that the right "to 
follow a chosen profession free fr om unreasonable governmental 
interference comes within the liberty and property concepts of the Fifth 
Amendment." Id. at 492. It is consistent with Greene to hold that eviction 
from a track in a state where one is licensed to race constitutes an 
unreasonable interference with the pursuit of one's chosen profession, 
particularly when that track is the only place in the state that one can 
practice one's profession from November through April. 
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track. It accurately points out that, in Fitzgerald, a 
Pennsylvania Racing Commission Rule requir ed the track to 
notify the Commission of all people excluded ther efrom. 
Delaware, it seems, has no comparable r egulation. Dover 
Downs seizes on this distinction and maintains that, except 
to the extent that the Crissmans themselves publicized 
their exclusion, their reputations have not been damaged 
by this incident. On the other hand, their exclusion in all 
probability would be known to the other owners and 
trainers of race horses at the Dover Downs track, and those 
associated with them. In our view, the Crissmans have 
presented sufficient evidence to warrant trial on this issue. 
 
Dover Downs acknowledges that the HRC was notified 
orally of the Crissmans' expulsion. Although Dover Downs 
tries to downplay the significance of this notification, 
Fitzgerald held that the notification of the r elevant 
regulatory agency amounts to a deprivation of the 
plaintiff 's liberty interest in his employment reputation. See 
Fitzgerald, 607 F.2d at 602. Moreover, Charles Lockhart's 
deposition reveals that this notification was only given after 
an HRC employee asked him whether Mr. Crissman had 
been excluded from the track. Apparently, the HRC agent 
asked "because he had heard that [Crissman] had been 
[excluded]." (App. at 260). This testimony demonstrates that 
the expulsion of the Crissmans from Dover Downs has, at 
some point, been the subject of conversation in Delaware 
harness racing circles. Although it r emains possible that 
the Crissmans themselves are primarily r esponsible for the 
publicity surrounding their exclusion, we believe, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Crissmans, 
that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Dover 
Downs' expulsion adversely affected their r eputation. 
 
We conclude that the Crissmans have pr esented a triable 
issue of fact as to whether their expulsion fr om Dover 
Downs amounted to a deprivation of a liberty inter est 
cognizable under S 1983 and an injury to their liberty 
interest in employment reputation. The question then 
remains whether they received due pr ocess of law. Under 
Fitzgerald, a suspended harness racing trainer is entitled, 
at the very least, to a reasonably prompt post-suspension 
hearing. See Fitzgerald, 607 F.2d at 603. It is undisputed 
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that the Crissmans never received any hearing. 
Accordingly, the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment for Dover Downs and we will remand this case for 
trial. 
 
V. 
 
Finally, the Crissmans ask this court to reverse the 
District Court's denial of their motion for a pr eliminary 
injunction. A court ruling on a motion for a pr eliminary 
injunction must consider the following four factors: 
 
       1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable 
       probability of success on the merits; 2) whether the 
       movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the 
       relief; 3) whether granting preliminary r elief will result 
       in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and 4) 
       whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the 
       public interest. 
 
Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d 
Cir. 1999). We review the denial of a preliminary injunction 
only for "an abuse of discretion, a clear error of law, or a 
clear mistake on the facts." Id. 
 
In light of our determination that a symbiotic relationship 
existed between the State of Delaware and Dover Downs 
and based on substantial evidence presented by the 
Crissmans that they were denied due process of law, we 
believe they had a reasonable chance of succeeding on the 
merits. 
 
The other three factors also cut in favor of the 
Crissmans. The Crissmans have suffered irreparable harm 
due to the denial of the injunction "because the nature of 
harness racing is such that no adequate r emedy exists at 
law to compensate [them] for losses to income and 
reputation sustained from an unlawful suspension." 
Fitzgerald, 607 F.3d at 601. Ther e is no evidence that Dover 
Downs would be harmed if the Crissmans wer e allowed to 
race. Finally, there is no evidence that the public would be 
adversely affected if the Crissmans wer e reinstated at Dover 
Downs. Thus, the District Court's denial of the Crissmans' 
motion for preliminary injunctive relief will be reversed. 
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VI. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, summary 
judgment in favor of Dover Downs, Inc. will be r eversed and 
the case remanded to the District Court, with directions to 
grant plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, and 
for such further proceedings as are consistent with this 
opinion. 
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